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Abstract
Probabilistic model checking is a formal veriﬁcation technique for establishing the correctness,
performance and reliability of systems which exhibit stochastic behaviour. As in conventional
veriﬁcation, a precise mathematical model of a real-life system is constructed ﬁrst, and, given
formal speciﬁcations of one or more properties of this system, an analysis of these properties is
performed. The exploration of the system model is exhaustive and involves a combination of
graph-theoretic algorithms and numerical methods. In this paper, we give a brief overview of
the probabilistic model checker PRISM (www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼dxp/prism) implemented at the
University of Birmingham. PRISM supports a range of probabilistic models and speciﬁcation
languages based on temporal logic, and has been recently extended with costs and rewards. We
describe our experience with using PRISM to analyse a number of case studies from a wide range
of application domains. We demonstrate the usefulness of probabilistic model checking techniques
in detecting ﬂaws and unusual trends, focusing mainly on the quantitative analysis of a range of
best, worst and average-case system characteristics.
Keywords: Automatic veriﬁcation, temporal logic, Markov models, probabilistic model checking,
performability, reliability, dependability.
1 Introduction
Model checking is an automatic model-based veriﬁcation approach that ex-
plores all system executions and is therefore more powerful than testing or
simulation-based system analysis techniques. Models can be created manu-
ally using modelling languages tailored to the particular application domain,
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for example a hardware description language, or extracted via abstract inter-
pretation from actual source code in C/C++ or Java. A model checker aims
to establish that the model satisﬁes a given speciﬁcation, usually stated in a
variant of temporal logic, or else produce error diagnostics. Since its introduc-
tion in 1980s, model checking has made great advances, becoming a leading
research focus as well as standard industrial practice. When applied as part of
a design process, its ability to detect errors in the designs before manufacture
can improve reliability and reduces production costs both in hardware designs
(e.g. Intel) and software (e.g. SLAM at Microsoft).
The vast majority of research in model checking has concerned discrete
behavioural aspects, such as nondeterminism and concurrency. Recent de-
velopments in technology – the increasing trend for mobile, portable, ubiqui-
tous, adaptive, self-organising systems – have substantially raised the proﬁle of
probabilistic, and more generally quantitative modelling and veriﬁcation tech-
nologies for software. Features such as real-time and probability are already
utilised in real-world distributed protocols (e.g. Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11). In-
deed, randomisation is key to achieve symmetric distributed solutions, self-
conﬁguring protocols, self-organising systems, fault-tolerant algorithms and
scalable protocols. Probability also plays an important role in modelling un-
certainty, in planning and decision making, and for analysing performance and
dependability.
Probabilistic model checking is a relatively recent development which aims
to deliver automatic veriﬁcation technology for probabilistic systems. The
theoretical aspects of probabilistic model checking have been studied since ﬁrst
introduced by Hart, Sharir and Pnueli [18]. As in conventional model checking,
a model of the probabilistic system, usually some variant of a Markov chain, is
built and then subjected to algorithmic analysis in order to establish whether it
satisﬁes a given speciﬁcation. The speciﬁcations are usually stated as formulae
of probabilistic temporal logic which, in addition to conventional modalities,
may include probabilistic operators whose outcome is true/false depending on
the probability of certain executions. The model checking procedure combines
traversal of the underlying transition graph with numerical solution methods.
The model checker can either produce an answer yes or no, by comparing the
obtained probability with the given threshold, or simply return the likelihood
of the occurrence of executions. For example, suitable correctness properties
for a randomised leader election protocol are “the leader is eventually elected
with probability 1” and “the expected time to leader election is 10 ms”, and
for a multimedia protocol “the probability of a frame being delivered within
5 ms is at least 90%” and “the worst case time to deliver a frame is 1.5 ms”.
Although algorithms for model checking probabilistic systems have been
M. Kwiatkowska et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 153 (2006) 5–316
known since the mid-1980s [53], it is only recently that experimental, tool im-
plementation work has begun. Software tools available for probabilistic model
checking include PRISM [27,45], E T MC2 [20], and Rapture [23]. PRISM,
the internationally leading and widely used Probabilistic model checker, has
been developed at the University of Birmingham and used to model and anal-
yse over 30 real-world protocols. PRISM provides support for three types of
models and a range of quantitative analysis techniques such as expected time,
average power consumption, and probability of delivery by a deadline. It re-
lies on the use of symbolic model checking technology, employing sophisticated
data structures based on binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [28,34] and eﬃcient
algorithms [34,55]. PRISM combines graph-theoretical analysis with numeri-
cal solution (for exact best/worst case analysis), statistical, simulation-based
methods (for approximate analysis) and parallelisation.
In this paper, we report on our experiences with using PRISM to model
and analyse a range of case studies, from domains as wide-ranging as ran-
domised coordination algorithms and biochemical reactions. We found that
the techniques are expressive enough to analyse properties of genuine inter-
est to protocol designers, and have indeed proved useful through discovering
errors. We demonstrate the usefulness of quantitative analysis against prop-
erties based on temporal logic, but returning quantities computed by model
checking, for example likelihood of termination or average power consumption,
rather than a true/false answer. The advantage of such quantitative analysis
is that the results can be plotted as graphs that can be inspected for trends
and anomalies. We also illustrate the merits of exhaustive probabilistic model
checking over simulation-based techniques. In particular, we are able to com-
pute exact quantities, rather than approximations based on a large number of
simulations, thus enabling to arrive at complete, exhaustive conclusions, e.g.,
computing the best- and worst-case performance for all possible parameter
values, or under any scheduling.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin with a brief introduction
to the topic of probabilistic model checking in Section 2. Then we give an
overview of the PRISM model checker in Section 3, followed by its modelling
language and property speciﬁcation notation respectively in Sections 4 and 5.
Three case studies, self-stabilisation, dynamic voltage and molecular reactions,
are described in Section 6, and results of their analysis discussed together with
example models and property speciﬁcations. We conclude with Section 7.
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2 Probabilistic model checking
A probabilistic model checker takes two types of inputs, a probabilistic model
and a property speciﬁcation. The former is usually described in a high-level
model description language, which is then transformed into an internal rep-
resentation suitable for analysis. The latter is typically based on temporal
logic, enriched with probabilistic operators, and may include additional fea-
tures such as time bounds or costs depending on the model. The model checker
explores the model and produces two types of outputs, either true/false to in-
dicate whether the speciﬁcation holds in the model, or the numerical value,
for example, the probability or expected time for each state.
2.1 The Models
The simplest probabilistic models are variants of (discrete space) Markov
chains, and namely discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), Markov decision
processes (MDPs) and continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs). All give rise
to transition systems where the transition relation between states is proba-
bilistic. The models can be endowed with additional information labelling the
states and transitions, for example atomic propositions or costs.
A DTMC is fully probabilistic; it is given as a (ﬁnite) set of states S, a
subset of initial states S¯ ⊆ S and a transition probability matrix P : S×S →
[0, 1]. For each pair s, s′ of states, the probability of making a transition from
s to s′ is given by P(s, s′). We require that
∑
s′∈S P(s, s
′) = 1 for all states
s ∈ S. Terminating states can be modelled by adding a self-loop, i.e. setting
P(s, s) = 1.
Markov decision processes (MDPs) extend DTMCs by additionally allow-
ing non-deterministic behaviour that is needed, for example, to model asyn-
chronous parallel composition. An MDP is deﬁned by a set of states S, a set
of initial states S¯ ⊆ S and a function Steps which maps each state in S to
ﬁnite non-empty set of probability distributions over S. Intuitively, the next
transition from a state s ∈ S is determined by nondeterministically selecting
an element μ of Steps(s) and then choosing a state probabilistically, according
to the distribution μ.
Continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs), similarly to DTMCs, can model
probabilistic behaviour only, but they allow the modelling of real (continuous)
time, rather than discrete time-steps. Formally, a CTMC is deﬁned by a
set of states S, a set of initial states S¯ ⊆ S and a transition rate matrix
R : S × S → R. This gives the rate R(s, s′) at which transitions occur
between each pair of states s, s′. The probability of moving from s to s′
within t (∈ R>0) time units is described as a negative exponential distribution
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1 − e−R(s,s
′)t with the rate taken as the parameter. If R(s, s′) > 0 for more
than one state s′, a race between the outgoing transitions from s occurs. This
means that the probability of moving from s to s′ is equal to the probability
that the delay of going from s to s′ “ﬁnishes before” the delays of any other
outgoing transition from s.
In models of all three types, a path is a sequence of states, each consecutive
pair of which is connected by a transition, i.e. for which the corresponding
probability or rate is non-zero. A path of a model corresponds to a single run
or execution of the system which the model represents.
2.2 Property speciﬁcations
In conventional model checking, the speciﬁcations typically aim to ascertain
whether a particular event eventually occurs, possibly with additional quantiﬁ-
cation over paths. In probabilistic model checking, since the transition relation
is probabilistic, we are interested in calculating the probability of events occur-
ring. This is achieved through extending temporal logics such as CTL or LTL
with a probabilistic operator P ∼ p [·], that can be applied to sets of paths re-
turning their likelihood. This operator has a probability bound (p ∈ [0, 1]) and
a relational operator (∼∈ {<,≤,≥, >}). Comparing the resulting probability
of the speciﬁed set of paths with the bound p of the enclosing operator yields
a conventional boolean formula. In the case of MDP models, there are two
types of branching, nondeterministic, determined by a scheduler, and proba-
bilistic, governed by the probability distribution. This must be reﬂected in the
interpretation of properties, which must be of the form ‘under any scheduling
of processes, yielding the minimum/maximum over all the possible ways of
resolving nondeterminism instead of the exact probability.
The speciﬁcation notations also take into account additional decorations in
the model, for example real-valued time and costs and rewards. Real-valued
time bounds are allowed to reason about CTMCs (the logic CSL), and the
logics are further enhanced with additional expectation operators.
2.3 Probabilistic analysis methods
Once a probabilistic model has been built, it can be subjected to various
types of analysis. Conventional model checking methods focus on the under-
lying transition graph, allowing for reachability analysis and temporal logic
model checking. On the other hand, conventional probabilistic analysis uses
simulation or analytical solution methods to obtain performance and quality
of service estimates, typically represented as functions of system parameters.
Probabilistic model checking combines probabilistic analysis and conventional
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reachability in a single tool. In comparison with simulation, its advantage is
full coverage of the executions and therefore exact answers, and in contrast
with analytical approaches a more detailed analysis, especially the ‘corner
cases’, is often possible. The drawback is the state-space explosion, which
can be addressed through statistical, simulation-based methods at a cost of
approximate answers.
Probabilistic model checking algorithm proceed through a combination of
graph-traversal and numerical computation. Qualitative probabilistic model
checking, i.e. the case of probability bounds being 0 or 1, involves only graph
traversal. For quantitative model checking, the core component is numerical
solution of linear equation systems and linear optimisation problems. For
a detailed introduction to the ﬁeld of probabilistic model checking see, for
example, [46,4].
3 The PRISM model checker
We now give a high-level overview of the functionality of the PRISM model
checker.
3.1 Tool overview
PRISM [27,45] is a probabilistic model checker developed at the University
of Birmingham. It accepts probabilistic models described in its modelling
language, a simple, high-level state-based language. Three types of proba-
bilistic models are supported directly; these are discrete-time Markov chains
(DTMCs), Markov decision processes (MDPs), and continuous-time Markov
chains (CTMCs). Additionally, probabilistic timed automata (PTAs) are par-
tially supported, with the subset of diagonal-free PTAs with digital clocks
supported directly [29].
The property speciﬁcation language of PRISM is based on two existing
temporal logics. PCTL [17,8] is the probabilistic computation tree logic, an
extension of CTL with the probabilistic operator, which is appropriate for the
discrete-time models (DTMCs and MDPs). For CTMCs, CSL [2,5] (continu-
ous stochastic logic) is supported; it also includes the probabilistic operator
but additionally allows real-valued time bounds to be expressed. Probabilis-
tic timed automata have a logic PTCTL, an extension of TCTL, a subset of
which is supported via connection to Kronos [12].
A simpliﬁed version of the overall structure of the tool is shown in Figure 1.
PRISM ﬁrst parses the model description and constructs an internal rep-
resentation of the probabilistic model, computing the reachable state space of
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Fig. 1. The structure of PRISM
the model and discarding any unreachable states. This represents the set of
all feasible conﬁgurations which can arise in the modelled system.
Next, the speciﬁcation is parsed and appropriate model checking algo-
rithms are performed on the model by induction over syntax. In some cases,
such as for properties which include a probability bound, PRISM will simply
report a true/false outcome, indicating whether or not each property is satis-
ﬁed by the current model. More often, however, properties return quantitative
results and PRISM reports, for example, the actual probability of a certain
event occurring in the model. Furthermore, PRISM supports the notion of ex-
periments, which is a way of automating multiple instances of model checking.
This allows the user to easily obtain the outcome of one or more properties
as functions of model and property parameters. The resulting table of values
can either be viewed directly, exported for use in an external application such
as a spreadsheet, or plotted as a graph. For the latter, PRISM incorporates
substantial graph-plotting functionality. This is often a very useful way of
identifying interesting patterns or trends in the behaviour of a system. The
reader is invited to consult the “Case Studies” section of the PRISM website
[45] for many examples of this kind of analysis.
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the PRISM graphical user interface, illus-
trating the results of a model checking experiment being plotted on a graph.
The tool also features a built-in text-editor for the PRISM language. Alter-
natively, all model checking functionality is also available in a command-line
version of the tool. PRISM is a free, open source application. It presently
operates on Linux, Unix, Windows and Macintosh operating systems. Both
binary and source code versions can be downloaded from the website [45].
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Fig. 2. A screenshot of the PRISM graphical user interface
3.2 Implementation
One of the most notable features of PRISM is that it is a symbolic model
checker, meaning that its implementation uses data structures based on bi-
nary decision diagrams (BDDs). These provide compact representations and
eﬃcient manipulation of large, structured probabilistic models by exploiting
regularity that is often present in those models because they are described
in a structured, high-level modelling language. More speciﬁcally, since we
need to store numerical values, PRISM uses multi-terminal binary decision
diagrams (MTBDDs) [11,3] and a number of variants [28,43,34] developed to
improve the eﬃciency of probabilistic analysis which involve combinations of
symbolic data structures such as MTBDDs and conventional explicit storage
schemes such as sparse matrices and arrays. Since its release in 2001, the
model size capacity and tool eﬃciency has increased substantially (1010 is fea-
sible for CTMCs and higher for other types of models). PRISM employs and
builds upon the Colorado University Decision Diagram package [49] by Fabio
Somenzi which implements BDD/MTBDD operations.
The underlying computation in PRISM involves a combination of:
• graph-theoretical algorithms, for reachability analysis, conventional temporal
logic model checking and qualitative probabilistic model checking, and
• numerical computation, for quantitative probabilistic model checking, e.g.
solution of linear equation systems (for DTMCs and CTMCs) and linear
optimisation problems for (MDPs).
Graph-theoretical algorithms are comparable to the operation of a conven-
tional, non-probabilistic model checker and are always performed in PRISM
using BDDs. For numerical computation, PRISM uses iterative methods
rather than direct methods due to the size of the models that need to be
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handled. For solution of linear equation systems, it supports a range of well-
known techniques, including the Jacobi, Gauss-Seidel and SOR (successive
over-relaxation) methods. For the linear optimisation problems which arise
in the analysis of MDPs, PRISM uses dynamic programming techniques, in
particular, value iteration. Finally, for transient analysis of CTMCs, PRISM
incorporates another iterative numerical method, uniformisation, which is also
known as randomisation or Jensen’s method.
In fact, for numerical computation, the tool actually provides three distinct
numerical engines . The ﬁrst is implemented purely in MTBDDs (and BDDs);
the second uses sparse matrices; and the third is a hybrid, using a combination
of the two. Performance (time and space) of the tool may vary depending
on the choice of the engine. Typically the sparse engine is quicker than its
MTBDD counterpart, but requires more memory. The hybrid engine aims to
provide a compromise, providing faster computation than pure MTBDDs but
using less memory than sparse matrices (see [28,43]). By default, PRISM uses
the hybrid engine.
4 The PRISM modelling language
The PRISM modelling language is a simple, state-based language based on
the Reactive Modules formalism of Alur and Henzinger [1]. In this section,
we give a brief outline of the language. For a full deﬁnition of the language
and its semantics, see [25]. A wide range of examples can be found both in
the “Case Studies” section of the PRISM website [45] and in the distribution
of the tool itself.
4.1 Modules, variables and commands
The fundamental components of the PRISM language are modules and vari-
ables. Variables are typed (integers, reals and booleans are supported) and
can be local or global. A model is composed of modules which can interact
with each other. A module contains a number of local variables. The values
of these variables at any given time constitute the state of the module. The
global state of the whole model is determined by the local state of all modules,
together with the values of the global variables. The behaviour of each module
is described by a set of commands . A command takes the form:
[] g → λ1 : u1 + . . . + λn : un ;
The guard g is a predicate over all the variables in the model (including
those belonging to other modules). Each update ui describes a transition
which the module can make if the guard is true. A transition is speciﬁed by
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// A coin process
dtmc
const int HEADS = 1;
const int TAILS = 2;
module coin
x : [0..3] init 0;
[] (x = 0) → 0.5 : (x ′ = HEADS) + 0.5 : (x ′ = TAILS);
[] (x > 0) → 1 : (x ′ = x);
endmodule
Fig. 3. The PRISM Language: Example of a Coin
giving the new values of the variables in the module, possibly as an expression
formed from other variables or constants. The expressions λi are used to assign
probabilistic information to the transitions.
An example of a module is given in Figure 3. It implements an electronic
coin, which will assign HEADS or TAILS to the variable x with probability
0.5 (x′ denotes updated variable) when x is zero, and otherwise it will retain
the previous value of x. In this case, there is only one initial state, but PRISM
allows the speciﬁcation of a set of initial states, see [25].
The module is a DTMC (keyword dtmc). The other two possibilities are
Markov decision processes and continuous-time Markov chains, keywords mdp
and ctmc respectively. The interpretation of λi varies depending on the model,
i.e. it is a probability for DTMCs and rate for CTMCs. If the guards are
overlapping, say (x > 0) were replaced with (x = 0)&(x > 0), this indicates
(local) nondeterminism, which is illegal within a DTMC but allowed in MDPs.
4.2 Composing modules
The probabilistic model corresponding to a PRISM language description is
constructed as the parallel composition of its modules. In every state of the
model, there is a set of commands (belonging to any of the modules) which
are enabled, i.e. whose guards are satisﬁed in that state. The choice between
which command is performed (i.e. the scheduling) depends on the model type.
For a DTMC, the choice is probabilistic, with each enabled command selected
with equal probability; for an MDP, it is nondeterministic; and for CTMCs it
is modelled as a race condition.
PRISM also supports multi-way synchronisation in the style of process
algebras. For synchronisation to take eﬀect, commands are labelled with ac-
tions that are placed between the square brackets. We illustrate this with an
example of a model of an N -place queue of jobs and a server which removes
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// N-place queue + server
ctmc
const int N = 10;
const double mu = 1/10;
const double lambda = 1/2;
const double gamma = 1/3;
module queue
q : [0..N ];
[] q < N → mu : (q ′ = q + 1);
[] q = N → mu : (q ′ = q);
[serve ] q > 0 → lambda : (q ′ = q − 1);
endmodule
module server
s : [0..1];
[serve ] s = 0 → 1 : (s ′ = 1);
[] s = 1 → gamma : (s ′ = 0);
endmodule
Fig. 4. The PRISM Language: N-place queue and server example
jobs from the queue and processes them. The PRISM code can be found in
Figure 4.
There are two modules, one modelling the queue and the other the server.
For example, the serve action in this command from Figure 4:
[serve] q > 0 → lambda : (q ′ = q − 1);
is used to force two or more modules to make transitions simultaneously (i.e.
to synchronise). For example, in state (3, 0) (i.e. q = 3 and s = 0), the com-
posed model can move to state (2, 1), synchronising over the serve action. The
rate of this transition is equal to the product of the two individual rates (in
this case, lambda · 1 = lambda). The product of two rates does not always
meaningfully represent the rate of a synchronised transition. A common tech-
nique, as seen here, is to make one action passive, with rate 1, and one action
active, which actually deﬁnes the rate for the synchronised transition. By de-
fault, all modules are combined using the standard CSP parallel composition
(i.e. modules synchronise over all their common actions). In addition, PRISM
supports several other CSP parallel operators (alphabetised parallel, interleav-
ing, etc) and is able to import models written in a subset of the stochastic
process algebra PEPA [21].
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4.3 Costs and rewards
PRISM includes support for the speciﬁcation and analysis of properties based
on costs and rewards. This means that PRISM can be used to reason, for
example, about properties such as “expected time”, “expected number of lost
messages” or “expected power consumption”.
The basic idea is that probabilistic models (of all three types) developed in
PRISM can be augmented with costs or rewards: real values associated with
certain states or transitions of the model (costs are generally perceived to be
“bad” and rewards to be “good” but, numerically, the two are identical).
Rewards are associated with models using the rewards...endrewards con-
struct. State rewards can be speciﬁed using multiple reward items, each of the
form “guard : reward ;”, where guard is a predicate (over all the variables of
the model) and reward is an expression (containing any variables, constants,
etc. from the model). For example:
rewards
x = 0 : 100;
x > 0 & x < 10 : 2 ∗ x ;
x = 10 : 100;
endrewards
assigns a reward of 100 to states satisfying x = 0 or x = 10 and a reward of
2 ∗ x to states satisfying x > 0 & x < 10. Note that a single reward item can
assign diﬀerent rewards to diﬀerent states, depending on the values of model
variables in each one. Any states which do not satisfy the guard of any reward
item will have no reward assigned to them. For states which satisfy multiple
guards, the reward assigned to the state is the sum of the rewards for all the
corresponding reward items.
Rewards can also be assigned to transitions of a model, which are speciﬁed
in a similar fashion, see [25].
5 Property speciﬁcations
Properties of PRISM models are expressed in a language based on the logics
PCTL (for DTMCs and MDPs) and CSL (for CTMCs), probabilistic exten-
sions of the classical temporal logic CTL originally introduced in [17,8] (PCTL)
and [2,5] (CSL). PRISM supports numerous additional customisations and ex-
tensions of these two logics; for full details see [25].
As an illustration, we list some typical examples of properties which PRISM
can handle, giving both the PRISM syntax with respect to presumed atomic
propositions (e.g. elected , init) and a natural language translation:
• P ≥ 1 [ true U elected ]
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“the algorithm eventually elects a leader with probability 1”
• init ⇒ P < 0.1 [ true U≤100 num errors > 5 ]
“from an initial state, the probability that more than 5 errors occur within
the ﬁrst 100 time units is less than 0.1”
• down ⇒ P > 0.75 [ !fail U[1, 2] up ]
“when a shutdown occurs, the probability of system recovery being com-
pleted in between 1 and 2 hours without further failures occurring is greater
than 0.75”
• S < 0.01 [ num routers < min routers ]
“in the long-run, the probability that an inadequate number of routers are
operational is less than 0.01”
The satisfaction of a property (i.e. whether it is true or false) is deﬁned for
a single state of a model. When analysing a property, PRISM considers it to
be true if it is satisﬁed in all states of the model, and false otherwise. As in
the second example above, properties can be preﬁxed with an implication to
check satisfaction in a certain subset of model states.
The two principal operators in PRISM’s property speciﬁcation language
are the P (probabilistic) and S (steady-state) operators. By default, in both
cases, these operators include a probability bound (≥ 1, < 0.1, > 0.75 and
< 0.01 in the examples above). Informally, a property using the probabilistic
operator, such as P>0.75 [pathprop], is true in a state s of a DTMC, MDP
or CTMC if “the probability that path property pathprop is satisﬁed by the
paths from state s is greater than 0.75”.
PRISM supports path properties constructed from three temporal opera-
tors: X (“next”), U (“until”), and Utime (“bounded until”). The ﬁrst, X a, is
satisﬁed if a is true in the next state. The second, a U b, is satisﬁed if b is
eventually true and a is true up until that point. One common usage of this
type of property is the case where a is true (as in several of the examples
above). The path property true U b means simply that b is eventually true.
The third type, a Utime b, is satisﬁed if b becomes true within the time inter-
val time and a is true up until that point. For DTMCs and MDPs, where time
proceeds in discrete steps, the time interval time is simply an integer upper
bound, e.g. U ≤ 10. For CTMCs, which model real (continuous) time, time
can be an arbitrary interval of the reals, as in these examples: ≤ 1.5, ≥ 5.0,
[12.75, 13.25].
For a DTMC, the probability measure of the set of paths from a state s
which satisfy a particular path property of the types discussed above is well-
deﬁned; see e.g. [17]. Similarly, for a CTMC, the probability measure for such
a set of paths can also be deﬁned; see e.g. [5]. For MDPs, however, a proba-
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bility measure can only be feasibly deﬁned once all nondeterminism has been
removed. Hence, the actual meaning of the property P bound [ pathprop ] for
an MDP is taken to be “the probability that path property pathprop is satisﬁed
by the paths from state s meets the bound bound for all possible resolutions
of nondeterminism”. This means that, for an MDP, properties using the P
operator actually reason about the minimum or maximum probability, over
all possible resolutions of nondeterminism, that a certain type of behaviour
is observed. This depends on the bound attached to the P operator: a lower
bound (> or ≥) relates to minimum probabilities and an upper bound (< or
≤) to maximum probabilities. For more details on this, see e.g. [6].
The steady-state operator S is used to reason about the “steady-state”
behaviour of a model, i.e. its behaviour in the “long-run” or “equilibrium”.
Although this could in principle relate to all three model types, PRISM cur-
rently only provides support for CTMCs. The deﬁnition of steady-state (long-
run) probabilities for ﬁnite CTMCs is well deﬁned (see e.g. [50]). Informally,
a property such as Sbound [ prop ] is true in a state s of a CTMC if “start-
ing from s, the steady-state (long-run) probability of being in a state which
satisﬁes prop, meets the bound bound”.
5.1 Quantitative probability calculations
In PRISM, we can also directly specify properties which evaluate to a numer-
ical value. This is achieved by replacing the probability bounds from the P
and S operators with =? and is illustrated in the following examples:
• P =? [ ! proc2 terminate U proc1 terminate ]
“the probability that process 1 terminates before process 2 does”
• Pmax =? [ true U≤T (message lost>10) ]
“the maximum probability that more than 10 messages have been lost by
time T”
• S =? [ (queue size/max size)>0.75 ]
“the long-run probability that the queue is more than 75% full”
Note that this is only allowed when the P or S in question is the outermost
operator of the property.
For MDPs, the probabilities can only be computed once the nondetermin-
ism has been resolved. Hence, PRISM actually computes either the minimum
or maximum probability of a path property being satisﬁed, quantifying over
all possible resolutions (i.e. the best and worst cases). Therefore, for MDPs
we use either Pmin =? or Pmax =?.
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By default, the result for properties of this kind is the probability for the
initial state of the model. It is also possible, however, to obtain the probability
for an arbitrary state, as shown in the following example:
• P =? [ queue size ≤ 5 U queue size < 5 {queue size = 5} ]
“the probability, from the state where the queue contains 5 jobs, of the
queue processing at least one job before another arrives”
Furthermore, it is possible to compute the minimum or maximum probability
for a particular class of states, e.g.:
• P =? [ ! proc2 terminate U proc1 terminate {init}{min} ]
“the minimum probability, over all possible initial conﬁgurations, that pro-
cess 1 terminates before process 2 does”
5.2 Speciﬁcation of reward-based properties
As described in Section 4.3, PRISM models can be augmented with informa-
tion about rewards. Properties can then be analysed by PRISM which relate
to the expected value of these rewards. These are speciﬁed using the R op-
erator, which works in a very similar fashion to the P and S operators. The
following are some typical examples:
• R =? [ I = 100 ]
“after 100 time units, the expected number of packets awaiting delivery”
• R =? [ C ≤ 24 ]
“the expected power consumption during the ﬁrst 24 hours of operation”
• Rmax =? [ F completed ]
“the worst-case (over all possible scheduling of processes) expected number
of messages lost during the execution of the protocol”
• R =? [ F elected {init}{max} ]
“from any initial conﬁguration, the worst-case expected number of steps
required for the leader election algorithm to complete”
• R < 10 [ S ]
“the long-run expected queue-size is less than 10”
Note the meaning ascribed to the properties is, of course, dependent on the
deﬁnitions of the rewards themselves. Note also that there are two distinct
types of interpretations of rewards. Firstly, they can be considered to be
instantaneous, where a measure of interest is simply the value of a state reward
at a particular time instant, e.g. “queue size”. These are typically used with
the I or S reward operators. Secondly, rewards can be cumulative, where
the values must be summed to provide a meaningful result, e.g. “number of
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messages lost”, “number of steps”, “time”, “power consumption”. These are
usually analysed with the C, F or S reward operators. Finally, we also point
out that, for cumulative rewards in CTMC models, the reward assigned to
each state is assumed to be the rate at which reward is accumulated in that
state, i.e. if the reward in a state is r and the state is occupied for time t, the
reward cumulated during this time will be r · t.
6 PRISM case studies
PRISM has been successfully applied to a large number of case studies in a
wide range of application domains, listed below. PRISM code for many of
them is also distributed with the tool itself.
• Analysis of quality of service (QoS) properties of several real-time com-
munication protocols, including Bluetooth [15], IEEE 1394 FireWire root
contention [12,32], Zeroconf [29], IEEE 802.3 CSMA/CD [33,14] and IEEE
802.11 wireless LANs [31].
• Veriﬁcation of probabilistic security protocols for anonymity (Crowds pro-
tocol [48], synchronous batching [13]), fair exchange and contract signing
[42], and non-repudiation [35].
• Analysis of randomised distributed algorithms for self-stabilisation, consen-
sus [30], Byzantine agreement [24], mutual exclusion and leader election
[16].
• Evaluation of the performance, reliability and dependability of a wide range
of systems, including dynamic power management schemes [41], NAND
multiplexing for nanotechnology [37,38], controller systems [26], product
data management systems [51,52], PC clusters, manufacturing systems and
queueing systems.
Below, we select three case studies that illustrate diﬀerent aspects of quanti-
tative analysis with PRISM. For further information about all the examples
described in this paper, and more, see the case studies section of the PRISM
website [45].
6.1 Self-stabilisation algorithms
A self-stabilising protocol for a network of processes is a protocol which trans-
forms a system from an unstable state to a stable state in a ﬁnite number of
steps and without any outside intervention. Here we consider a class of ran-
domised self-stabilising algorithms. Randomisation is often used in distributed
coordination problems as a symmetry breaker, to provide simple, elegant and
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fast solutions. Randomised distributed algorithms can be diﬃcult to analyse
because of non-trivial interactions between the probabilistic behaviour of each
process and the nondeterminism arising from concurrency between them. This
makes probabilistic model checking an attractive option.
In each of the protocols we consider, the network is a ring of identical
processes P1, . . . , Pn. The stable states are those where there is exactly one
process designated as “privileged” (has a token). Once a stable state is reached
this privilege (token) should be passed around the ring forever in a fair manner.
For each of the protocols, we check that the minimum probability of reaching
a stable state is 1 for all possible initial conﬁgurations and then compute both
the maximum and minimum expected time (number of steps) to reach a stable
state over every possible initial conﬁguration of the protocol. Note that, to
allow us to consider every possible conﬁguration, we include, in the PRISM
description of each protocol, a init . . . endinit statement which speciﬁes all
possible initial states.
6.1.1 Herman’s protocol
Our ﬁrst example is the algorithm of Herman [19]. The protocol operates
synchronously, the ring is oriented and the number of processes in the ring
must be odd. Tokens can be passed unidirectionally around the ring, and when
two tokens meet they are both eliminated. At every step of the algorithm,
each process with a token decides whether to keep it or pass it on based on
the outcome of a random coin toss. More precisely, each process Pi in the ring
has a local boolean variable xi, and processor Pi has a token if xi = xi−1. In a
basic step of the protocol, if the current values of xi and xi−1 are equal, then
processor Pi makes a (uniform) random choice as to the next value of xi, and
otherwise it sets it equal to the current value of xi−1. The PRISM source code
for a ring of size 3 is given in Figure 5.
We ﬁrst verify the property “a stable state is reached with probability
1”, expressed as P≥1 [ true U stable ] where stable is the atomic proposition
representing the fact that there is only one token, for example in the case of
three processes stable is given by the expression:
(x3=x1?1:0)+(x1=x2 ?1:0)+(x2=x3?1:0)=1 .
Secondly, since we assign a cost of one unit to each step of the algorithm (see
Figure 5), PRISM can be used to compute “the expected time (number of
steps) for self-stabilisation to complete”, expressed as R =?[ F stable]. More
precisely, we compute the worst case and best case expected times for all initial
conﬁgurations with K tokens, for diﬀerent values of K, which, in the case of
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// Herman’s self-stabilising algorithm [Her90]
// gxn/dxp 13/07/02
// the protocol is synchronous with no non-determinism (a DTMC)
probabilistic
// module for process 1
module process1
// bits in the ring (initially all the same i.e. a token in every place)
x1 : [0..1];
[step] x1 = x3 → 0.5 : (x1 ′ = 0) + 0.5 : (x1 ′ = 1);
[step] x1 ! = x3 → (x1 ′ = x3 );
endmodule
// add further processes through renaming
module process2 = process1 [x1 = x2 , x3 = x1 ] endmodule
module process3 = process1 [x1 = x3 , x3 = x2 ] endmodule
// cost - 1 for each transition (expected steps)
rewards
[] true : 1;
endrewards
// initial states (at least one token i.e. all states)
init
true
endinit
Fig. 5. PRISM language description of Herman’s self-stabilisation algorithm (3 processes)
three processes, is expressed by the speciﬁcations:
R=? [ F stable {(x3=x1?1:0)+(x1=x2?1:0)+(x2=x3?1:0)=K }{max} ]
R=? [ F stable {(x3=x1?1:0)+(x1=x2?1:0)+(x2=x3?1:0)=K }{min} ]
In Figure 6 we present the results obtained with PRISM when verifying these
speciﬁcations for a range of numbers of processes (N) and a range of values
of K.
This PRISM case study illustrates an unproven conjecture from [36] that
the worst case execution time for this algorithm always results from the case
where there are initially three tokens. The results also show that the min-
imum and maximum expected times respectively increase and decrease as
one increases the value of K. Furthermore, we can make a comparison with
simulation-based techniques. Model checking with PRISM involves a single
DTMC model with multiple initial states, for which PRISM executes a single
analysis. On the other hand, simulation, for example, would have to be per-
formed separately for each initial state (for example in the case when N = 19
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Fig. 6. Expected time results for Herman’s self-stabilisation algorithm.
the are approximately half a million possible conﬁgurations to consider) to
obtain comparable results.
6.1.2 Israeli and Jalfon protocol
This protocol originates from [22]. It operates asynchronously with an arbi-
trary scheduler, the ring is oriented and communication is bidirectional in the
ring. Each process has a boolean variable qi which represents the fact that
a token is in place i. A process is active if it has a token and only active
processes can be scheduled. When an active process is scheduled, it makes a
(uniform) random choice as to whether to move the token to its left or right.
As before, tokens colliding are merged into a single one.
We model the protocol in PRISM, which yields an MDP model (due to
the fact that the protocol is asynchronous). In Figure 7 we demonstrate the
outcome of model checking the minimum and maximum expected times to
reach a stable state given that the initial number of tokens equals K, as K
varies. In the case of three processes, this corresponds to checking the following
speciﬁcations (since this model is an MDP we use Rmax and Rmin as opposed
to R):
Rmax=? [ F (q1+q2+q3=1) {q1+q2+q3=K }{max} ]
Rmin=? [ F (q1+q2+q3=1) {q1+q2+q3=K }{min} ]
Note that this algorithm does not exhibit the trend observed for the Herman
ring, i.e. both the minimum and maximum expected times increase as we
increase K.
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Fig. 7. Expected time results for Israeli and Jalfon’s self-stabilisation algorithm.
6.1.3 Beauquier, Gradinariu and Johnen protocol
Finally, we consider the self-stabilising protocol of [7] for an arbitrary sched-
uler. It operates asynchronously, the ring is oriented, communication is uni-
directional in the ring, and the number processes in the ring must be odd.
Each process has two boolean variables, di and pi, where if di = di−1, process
i is said to have a deterministic token; and if pi = pi−1 process i is said to
have a probabilistic token. The stable states are those where there is only one
probabilistic token. A process is active if it has a deterministic token and only
active processes can be scheduled. When an active process is scheduled, it
sets di to be the negation of its current value (passes the deterministic token)
and, if it also has a probabilistic token, it makes a (uniform) random choice
as to the next value of pi (randomly selects whether to pass the probabilistic
token or not).
Figure 8 shows the results obtained with PRISM when computing the
worst- and best-case expected time until a stable state is reached as K and N
varies. In the results for this model, we observe the trend as in Herman’s ring,
namely that the conﬁgurations which achieve the maximum expected time are
those where only three processes have probabilistic tokens (compare Figure 6
and Figure 8).
6.2 Dynamic voltage scaling
Our next example concerns power management , an area that has become
extremely relevant because of the need to preserve battery life and hence
power eﬃciency. Here, we consider a technique called dynamic voltage scaling,
used in real-time embedded systems to achieve a compromise between battery
life and performance. The technique is used to schedule a number of tasks
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Fig. 8. Expected time results for Beauquier, Gradinariu and Johnen’s self-stabilisation algorithm.
which must be executed periodically. Each task has an associated period and
a worst-case execution time. The voltage of the system can also be varied
during scheduling, which has the eﬀect of reducing the power consumption of
the system. This will, however, slow down the execution of the current task.
The aim is to schedule tasks and voltage changes in such a way that power
consumption is minimised whilst ensuring that all tasks are executed within
their deadlines.
We have modelled and analysed in PRISM the performance of several
scheduling schemes from [44]. The need for probability arises because the ac-
tual execution time of each task is random (only a worst-case ﬁgure is known).
Nondeterminism also has to be modelled, to represent the fact that it is some-
times unspeciﬁed which task a scheduling scheme will pick. Thus, the derived
model is an MDP, and hence we examine the worst-case behaviour of any
implementation of each algorithm.
Figure 9 shows a comparison of “the maximum expected energy consumed
by a given time bound” for four scheduling schemes (see [45] for more details).
The actual cost measured is the square of the system’s voltage, which is pro-
portional to the energy consumed. The comparisons match those observed in
[44], obtained through simulation.
Another probabilistic model checking case study in this area can be found
in [39,40], which studies stochastic dynamic power management strategies.
Here, a wide range of properties can be analysed, e.g.: “the expected number
of jobs awaiting service at time T”, “the probability that 50 job requests have
been lost by time T” and “the expected long-run power consumption”.
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Fig. 9. Expected energy consumption for four diﬀerent dynamic voltage scaling scheduling schemes
over time.
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Fig. 10. Model checking results for the biochemical reaction case study
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6.3 Biological process modelling
Our last example comes from a new area of applications for probabilistic model
checking – biological processes. It is well known that the time until a reaction
occurs between two molecules can be adequately modelled as an exponen-
tial distribution, and therefore CTMC models are appropriate. At the same
time, molecular interactions can be described using process algebra. In [47],
the stochastic pi-calculus was used to model a number of biochemical reac-
tions which were then analysed through simulation. Here we use PRISM to
model the same reactions and analyse the models through probabilistic model
checking.
We construct a CTMC model of the system where the states of the CTMC
correspond to the number of molecules of each type and the transitions corre-
spond to the possible reactions between the molecules. The rate of a reaction
is determined by a base rate and the concentrations of the reactants (i.e. the
number of each type of molecule that takes part in the reaction).
We consider the ionic reaction:
Na + Cl ←→ Na+ + Cl−
involving the oxidation of sodium (Na) and reduction of chlorine (Cl). In
our experiments we suppose that initially the number of Na molecules and Cl
molecules equals N (and there are no Na+ or Cl− molecules).
The ﬁrst property we consider is the probability that the number of Na
molecules at time T equals i for i = 0, . . . , N . This property is speciﬁed by
the formula
P=?[true U[T ,T ] na=i ] .
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) plot, for the case when N = 10, these probabilities as
the value of T varies.
The second property we consider is the expected percentage of Na molecules
at time T . This property is speciﬁed by the CSL formula R =?[I = T ] where
the reward in a state is the percentage of Na molecules, i.e. if na is the variable
denoting the number of Na molecules, then the reward in each state equals
(100 · na)/N . Figure 10(c) presents the results, for a range of values of N ,
obtained with PRISM when verify this formula as the value of T varies.
Finally we consider the expected long-run percentage of Na molecules.
This property is speciﬁed by the CSL formula R =?[S]. where the reward in
a state is again the percentage of Na molecules. Figure 10(d) presents these
expected values as N varies.
Biological systems have been expressed in the process algebra PEPA [9]
and analysed using probabilistic model checking in PRISM in [10].
We also observe that conventional temporal model checking can be em-
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ployed to analyse biological systems, for example to consider the possibility
and impossibility of certain temporal relationships between events.
7 Conclusion
We have given a high-level overview of probabilistic model checking with
PRISM, the software tool developed at the University of Birmingham. Many
researchers have participated in the development of probabilistic model check-
ing techniques and PRISM, as well as performing case studies, see the “Peo-
ple” link at [45]; their contributions are gratefully acknowledged. We have
demonstrated the usefulness of probabilistic model checking in domains as
wide-ranging as performance analysis, reliability and biology, focusing in par-
ticular on the quantitative analysis which allows one to obtain exact best-,
worst- and average-case system characteristics. Of the 30 or so case studies
that were modelled, six contained ﬂaws.
In comparison with simulation, probabilistic model checking has a number
of advantages; it is exhaustive, good for ‘corner cases’ and analysis such as
‘for all possible initial states’ or ‘for all schedules’. On the other hand, sim-
ulation is more amenable to more complex stochastic scenarios such as those
featuring general distributions. State-space explosion is the main limitation of
probabilistic model checking, and techniques for abstraction, model reduction
and compositional reasoning are subject of active research.
Currently, PRISM models are ﬁnite-state and have to be manually de-
scribed in the modelling language, as opposed to being automatically extracted
from source code. We are extending PRISM in a number of directions, for
example with real-time [33], simulation-based approximate analysis [54,14],
parallelisation [55], and biology applications.
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